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Conference Summary:
International Experience with
the Conduct of Monetary Policy
under Inﬂation Targeting
Philipp Maier, Department of International Economic Analysis
he Bank of Canada's annual research conference,
held in July 2008, examined central banks’ experi-
ences with the conduct of monetary policy under
inﬂation targeting. Since the introduction of inﬂa-
tion targeting by New Zealand in 1990, and the formal
adoption of inﬂation targets by the Bank of Canada in 1991,
inﬂation targeting has become a popular monetary policy
framework. For Canada, inﬂation targeting has contributed
to keeping total CPI inﬂation very close to 2 per cent, on
average, since 1991. The reduction in inﬂation, coupled
with an explicit commitment to keep inﬂation low, stable,
and predictable, has helped to anchor inﬂation expectations
close to the 2 per cent inﬂation target as well. Since other
countries that have introduced inﬂation targeting have had
similar experiences, inﬂation targeting is often credited as a
monetary policy framework that can keep inﬂation low and
stable, and thus contribute to sound and stable macroeco-
nomic performance.1
The purpose of the Bank of Canada’s 2008 conference
was to review the international experiences with
inﬂation targeting in more detail by bringing together
central bankers from various inﬂation-targeting and
non-inﬂation-targeting countries around the world.
The conference consisted of two special lectures and
several sessions, and concluded with a panel discus-
sion. The opening John Kuszczak Memorial Lecture,
given by Carl Walsh, provided a systematic overview
of the international experience with inﬂation target-
ing.2 It was followed by sessions focused on i) how
1. Conference papers will be published in a forthcoming issue of International
Finance.
T
inﬂation targeting can manage external shocks, ii) var-
ious ways in which monetary policy decisions are
taken, and iii) the issues of transparency and commu-
nication. The sessions all followed the same format: a
distinguished scholar presented a paper outlining the
key issues, which was then discussed by a panel of
(mostly) central bankers, who responded to the paper
by sharing experiences or methodologies from their
central bank. The keynote address, which was deliv-
ered by Frederic Mishkin of the Board of Governors of
the U.S. Federal Reserve System, outlined possibilities
for further enhancements to the Fed’s communication
policy. A closing panel considered options for the
future of inﬂation targeting.
John Kuszczak Memorial Lecture:
Inﬂation Targeting—What Have We
Learned?
The John Kuszczak Memorial Lecture, which opened
the conference, was given by Carl Walsh of the Uni-
versity of California at Santa Cruz, who reviewed the
internationalexperiencewithinﬂationtargeting.Since
the introduction of inﬂation targets by New Zealand
nearly 20 years ago, more than 20 developed and
developing nations have adopted a program of inﬂa-
tion targeting. Walsh argues that the experience with
inﬂation targeting has typically been very positive,
given that no central bank has ever moved away from
2.  This lecture is funded by the Bank of Canada in memory of our esteemed
colleague, John Kuszczak, who died in 2002.36 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2008–2009
it (except to join a monetary union). Testing for the
statistical beneﬁts of inﬂation targeting is not straight-
forward, however. Among industrialized countries,
for example, the main difference between inﬂation tar-
geters and non-inﬂation targeters is that inﬂation
expectations are better anchored under inﬂation tar-
geting. Yet, better anchoring of inﬂation expectations
does not translate into statistically different levels of
inﬂation, volatilities of inﬂation, or differences in rates
of output growth. From a research perspective, this
presents a puzzle: Economic research typically
emphasizes the importance of well-anchored inﬂation
expectations, which should translate into less-volatile
output and inﬂation. For this reason, a cornerstone of
modern economic modelling in central banks is a
strong emphasis on inﬂation expectations.
The biggest success of inﬂation
targeting is its emphasis on a clear
focus on inﬂation and well-anchored
inﬂation expectations.
This statistical puzzle may be explained by the difﬁ-
culty of distinguishing between inﬂation-targeting
central banks and non-inﬂation-targeting central
banks, since the latter are adopting more and more
insights and practices from inﬂation targeters. Thus,
even though central banks such as the European Cen-
tral Bank (ECB) or the U.S. Federal Reserve are not
inﬂation-targeting central banks in a strict sense, their
conduct of monetary policy has incorporated many of
the insights that originate from inﬂation targeting.
This is visible, for instance, in attempts to inﬂuence
inﬂation expectations by announcing deﬁnitions of
price stability (in the case of the ECB), or by specifying
a level for inﬂation at the end of the projection horizon
(as the U.S. Federal Reserve has done at times). In that
sense, the biggest success of inﬂation targeting is not
the reduction in the rate of inﬂation, which has also
been achieved by other central banks with different
monetary policy frameworks, but its emphasis on a
clear focus on inﬂation and well-anchored inﬂation
expectations.
During the general discussion, it was noted that iden-
tifying the beneﬁts of inﬂation targeting might be eas-
ier for emerging markets, because the differences
between inﬂation-targeting central banks and those
using other monetary policy frameworks are more
pronounced. Various central bankers also noted that
having a clear mandate and improved accountability
facilitates not only communication with the public,
but also the political discussion. Adoption of a formal
target for inﬂation simply makes it easier to communi-
cate that the central bank focuses on price stability,
rather than on other goals.
Session 1: External Inﬂuences and
Inﬂation Targeting
Many small open economies that export commodities
experience periods of high economic volatility,
brought about by changes in the external environ-
ment. Large movements in the prices of commodities,
for example, can contribute to considerable ﬂuctua-
tions in exchange rates. The purpose of this session
was to examine how monetary policy should deal
withtheselargeandpotentiallypersistentﬂuctuations
in the exchange rate that are induced by changes in
the price of, or demand for, commodities.
Laurence Ball’s presentation, “Policy Responses to
Exchange Rate Movements,” explores ways to deal
with sectoral reallocation of resources caused by
swings in exchange rates. The main idea is that when
sectoral reallocation of capital and labour is costly,
policy-makers might consider dampening or smooth-
ing the reallocation induced by temporary ﬂuctuations
in the exchange rate. Policy-makers need to think
carefully about the source of exchange rate move-
ments, however, because the optimal policy response
might be different if the exchange rate moves in
response to changes in a narrow set of commodity
prices, as opposed to changes in demand for a broad
basket of exports. If policy-makers were to adopt poli-
cies to smooth ﬂuctuations in commodity prices, Pro-
fessor Ball advocates the use of ﬁscal policy.
The paper was discussed by Mark Wynne from the
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Klaus Schmidt-Heb-
bel from the Central Bank of Chile, and Bernard Hod-
getts from the Reserve Bank of New Zealand. The
discussants commented on the idea of smoothing sec-
toral reallocation. The international experience sug-
gests that attempts to limit ﬂuctuations in currency
markets may not be very successful in practice. For
example, the appreciation of New Zealand’s currency
between the summer of 2007 and the summer of 2008,
which was fuelled by strong commodity prices, was
so large that to offset the effects of the appreciation
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effects and better terms of trade) and to stabilize the
sectoral composition of the economy, a very large ﬁs-
cal contraction would have been required. Given that
this might have entailed large distributional effects, it
is not clear that such a policy is politically feasible. It
was noted as well that in many cases it is not clear ex
ante whether a shock to commodity prices or exchange
rates is temporary or permanent. Identifying the per-
sistence of changes in commodity prices or the
exchange rate is important for formulating the correct
policy response. If movements are temporary, smooth-
ing ﬂuctuations might be warranted; in the face of a
permanent or very persistent currency movement,
however, sectoral reallocation should not be resisted.
In fact, changes to the economic structure are required
to reﬂect the change in the external environment.
Taken together, experiences from other central banks
suggest that economic policies should probably be
directed to facilitate adjustment, rather than to resist-
ing sectoral reallocation.
Theinternationalexperiencesuggests
that attempts to limit ﬂuctuations in
currency markets may not be very
successful in practice.
Session 2: Monetary Policy Decision
Making
Today, more than 80 central banks take decisions in
committees, and no central bank has ever replaced a
committee by a single decision-maker. The structure
of the monetary policy committee is part of the overall
institutional framework of the central bank. The struc-
ture and composition of a committee can affect the
outcome of the meeting and, possibly, the quality of its
decisions. Hence, it is important to understand how
different committees take decisions.
In the presentation “Making Monetary Policy by
Committee,” Alan Blinder  reviewed several aspects
of the issue, including the beneﬁts of committee deci-
sion making, how committees take decisions, and the
different types of committees (individualistic, colle-
gial, or autocratically collegial committees). He ﬁnds
that there is no “best” way for central banks to take
decisions, since very different institutional arrange-
ments may each produce good decisions. Still, by
reviewing different decision-making structures, a
number of conclusions can be drawn. First, to facili-
tate an open exchange of views, committees should
not be too large. Second, not all members of a mone-
tary policy committee need to be specialists in mone-
tary economics, since “a fresh look by an outsider”
might be helpful at times. In light of this, Professor
Blinder recommends that committees should proba-
bly not be staffed exclusively by “Bank careerists.”
Third, committees seem to respond just as quickly as
simple decision-makers. And, lastly, the type of com-
mittee may substantially inﬂuence the Bank’s commu-
nication strategy. An individualistic committee where
decisions are taken by voting may opt for a more
diverse communication strategy than a collegial com-
mittee, where the emphasis on consensus is likely to
shape external communications quite differently.
There are signiﬁcant differences in
how central banks take decisions.
The discussants for this session were Zvi Eckstein
from the Bank of Israel, Francisco Ruge-Murcia from
the Université de Montréal, and Paul Tucker from the
Bank of England. The discussants agreed that there is
no single, optimal framework for taking decisions. An
interesting insight of this session is that there are sig-
niﬁcant differences in how central banks take deci-
sions. Several issues were raised during the discus-
sion. First, it was noted that the structure of decision
making might affect committee members’ behaviour.
In individualistic committees, i.e., those that do not
make decisions by consensus, the information content
provided by minutes might provide interesting
insights. Given the uncertainty about the outcome,
timely communication of committee decisions is more
difﬁcult to achieve through a detailed press communi-
qué after the meeting, since uncertainty about the out-
come of the vote prevents drafting a very detailed
communiqué in advance. Hence, minutes are likely to
be the main source of information for the public. Sec-
ond, voting might induce strategic behaviour. In light
of the scrutiny of the ﬁnancial press and potential
increases in uncertainty signalled to markets, commit-
tee members might weigh carefully whether they
want to signal dissent and make differences in views38 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2008–2009
run values of variables of interest to ﬁnancial markets
by publishing long-run forecasts; i.e., forecasts over a
horizon of 5 to 10 years—under appropriate monetary
policy. Essentially, this indicates the desired steady-
state value of, say, growth and inﬂation with which
the central bank feels comfortable.
The general discussion emphasized the difﬁculty of
communicating a clear goal under political con-
straints. Lack of a clear target introduces uncertainty
about the central bank’s long-run objective, and many
agreed with Professor Mishkin’s idea of providing
long-run forecasts as a way to give markets an indica-
tion of policy-makers’ views. This session also high-
lighted the difﬁculties associated with adopting a
focused objective like inﬂation targeting when the
political environment is not fully supportive.
Session 3: Communication and
Transparency
A trend witnessed in central banks over recent years is
a remarkable rise in transparency. The disclosure of
policy decisions and the macroeconomic analysis on
which they are based has increased greatly. The objec-
tive of this session was to review the trends in central
bank communication and transparency, to evaluate
their relationship with inﬂation targeting, and to
examine the effects of greater transparency and better
communication.
There is a trade-off between providing
the central bank’s best view on what
the likely path of interest rates will be
while simultaneously expressing
uncertainty around that outlook and
its conditionality.
The presentation, “Trends in Monetary Policy Trans-
parency,” by Petra Geraats of the University of Cam-
bridge, explains how central banks have become
much more transparent, not only to increase their
accountability, but also to enhance the effectiveness of
monetary policy. Comparing inﬂation-targeting cen-
tral banks with non-inﬂation targeters, Professor Ger-
aats ﬁnds that inﬂation targeters are more transparent
and have increased their levels of transparency much
public if they realize that their dissenting vote does
not change the decision. Lastly, it was discussed
whether committees respond to new information
more sluggishly than single decision-makers. Sharing
information, deliberating as a committee, and voting
might introduce frictions, for example, if not all com-
mittee members react to or process new information
in a similar fashion. This can imply that, in response to
a changing economic environment, the committee
might react more slowly than single policy-makers.
Keynote Address
While the beneﬁts of inﬂation targeting have been rec-
ognized by many central banks, political constraints
may restrict the framework under which some central
banks operate. For instance, central banks may not
have a clear inﬂation target, or their political mandate
might entail more than one goal, as is the case for the
U.S. Federal Reserve. This session explored ways for
central banks to reap some of the beneﬁts of inﬂation
targeting, even if they cannot move to a fully-ﬂedged
inﬂation-targeting regime.
Publishing projections helps to
anchorinﬂationexpectations,because
projections help ﬁnancial markets to
infer future central bank actions.
The backdrop to the keynote address by Frederic
Mishkin of the Board of Governors of the U.S. Federal
Reserve System was that the Fed changed its commu-
nication policy in October 2007. The Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC) has increased the trans-
parency of U.S. monetary policy by providing more
information on individual forecasts of FOMC mem-
bers and by extending the horizon for their projections
from two years to three. Publishing projections helps
to anchor inﬂation expectations because projections
help ﬁnancial markets to infer future central bank
actions. Challenges for policy-makers can arise, how-
ever, if central banks cannot directly communicate a
target value for inﬂation, e.g., because the central
bank’s mandate is not formulated in terms of a
numerical target or because the central bank has more
than one goal. The proposal Professor Mishkin advo-
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faster. And, lastly, there are still signiﬁcant differences
in the degree of information disclosure across central
banks. For instance, while the communications of
some central banks are focused on explaining the
rationale behind their most recent monetary policy
decision, other central banks go so far as to release a
projection for the future path of interest rates over the
next several quarters.
Professor Geraats’ presentation was discussed by
Tomas Holub of the Czech National Bank, Masayoshi
Amamiya of the Bank of Japan, Donald Kohn of the
Board of Governors of the U.S. Federal Reserve Sys-
tem, and Jan Qvigstad of the Norges Bank. The discus-
sion conﬁrmed the notion that stark differences exist
in central bank transparency and communication. The
discussion focused on how to minimize uncertainty in
ﬁnancial markets about future actions of the central
bank. While all central banks implicitly talk about
future policy decisions in some form, there is a trade-
off between providing the central bank’s best view on
what the likely path of interest rates will be while
simultaneously expressing uncertainty around that
outlook and its conditionality. Supplying information
in the form of  a projection for the future path of inter-
est rates provides insights into the central bank’s
thinking.  At the same time, it bears the risk of con-
straining the central bank from changing course in the
face of new information.
To avoid confusion in ﬁnancial markets, good commu-
nication is essential. The Czech National Bank, for
example, has provided verbal guidance on the path of
future interest rates since 2002, and began publishing
a forecast for the numerical path in 2008. In their view,
an important element in providing guidance to ﬁnan-
cial markets, while not constraining future actions of
the central bank, is to be very open about forecast
errors in terms of inﬂation, as well as for the interest
rate path. By regularly publishing historical charts
contrasting actual policy rates with the forecasted
interest rates at the time the decision was taken, the
Czech National Bank attempts to communicate the
uncertainty surrounding the interest rate forecast.
Experience from the Norges Bank indicates that since
it has been making the projection of the interest rate
path public, market participants seem to focus
increasingly on how the central bank interprets eco-
nomic news. This market behaviour is viewed as an
indication of how ﬁnancial markets’ understanding of
the central bank’s reaction to macroeconomic develop-
ments has improved. As well, for each interest rate
decision, the Norges Bank discusses shocks to the pre-
vious projection, and their implications for the interest
rate path (dubbed “delta analysis”). This policy has
helped to guide markets as to how the previous pro-
jection of the interest rate path has been changed by
economic developments. Lastly, a somewhat different
approach to communicate uncertainty surrounding
the economic outlook is taken by the Bank of Japan.
Here, each member of the monetary policy committee
is asked to provide their individual probability distri-
bution for growth of real gross domestic product and
consumer price inﬂation. The Bank of Japan then pub-
lishes the average of these calculations in a “risk-bal-
ance chart.” This indicates how the committee as a
whole views the distribution of risks for the economy.
Closing Panel: The Future of
Inﬂation Targeting
The closing panel featured Malcolm Edey from the
Reserve Bank of Australia, Ulrich Kohli from the
Swiss National Bank, John Murray from the Bank of
Canada, Lars Svensson from the Sveriges Riksbank,
and Bill White, formerly from the Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements. The topic was ways to further
enhance the inﬂation-targeting framework. Many cen-
tral banks are still searching for optimal solutions in
terms of decision-making, transparency, and commu-
nication. In light of this, the closing panel was looking
ahead and discussed possible innovations, both at the
technical level and in communicating uncertainty.
Lars Svensson emphasized the medium-term nature
of inflation targeting. He advocated a decision-
making procedure that is focused on following the
appropriate interest rate path to restore inﬂation to its
target level. His view is that, taking the target inﬂation
rate as given, the task of the monetary policy commit-
tee is to decide on the path for the output gap, and,
correspondingly, how quickly inﬂation can be
returned to the target. Viewed from this angle, the
focus of the discussion becomes the anticipated path
of interest rates, not the current interest rate decision.
From a practical perspective, the Swedish central bank
found it helpful to supply the members of the mone-
tary policy committee with charts showing the impli-
cations of different interest rate paths on the evolution
of key economic variables, such as inﬂation or the out-
put gap. The committee members then vote on differ-
ent scenarios generated by different interest rate
paths, rather than having to vote on the path directly.40 BANK OF CANADA REVIEW • WINTER 2008–2009
John Murray touched on many of the topics raised in
earlier sessions, including, in particular, the feasibility
and desirability of moving from inﬂation targeting to
price-level targeting. In an inﬂation-targeting frame-
work, past shocks to the price level are not reversed
by future monetary policy actions. This means that
even if inﬂation is kept within a tight range, the price
level need not necessarily evolve along a predeter-
mined path (depending on the shocks hitting the
economy). Consequently, even if two central banks
share very similar objectives in terms of inﬂation tar-
gets, over a longer period, their actual price-level
paths can differ substantially (depending, for exam-
ple, on their vulnerability to external shocks). One
way to reduce this uncertainty is to adopt a frame-
work whereby the central bank targets a path for the
price level.
In an inﬂation-targeting framework,
past shocks to the price level are not
reversed by future monetary policy
actions.
Malcolm Edey provided a skeptical perspective of the
potential beneﬁts of price-level-targeting. The eco-
nomic beneﬁts from inﬂation targeting have been sub-
stantial, and it is not clear, in his view, that the gains
from moving to price-level targeting will be large.
Similarly, he expressed concern that it would be hard
to communicate the case for an interest rate change,
based on the deviation in the price level from a path
that might have been set years earlier. With central
banks having made the “big gains” already, Edey is
wary of putting those gains at risk by overselling the
case for what he believes are “incremental further
improvements.” On this point, however, comments
from the ﬂoor indicated that the gains from inﬂation
targeting were initially widely underestimated, and
that it could be the case that the gain from moving to
price-level targeting might be underestimated as well.
Ulrich Kohli, representing a central bank that does not
consider itself an inﬂation targeter, focused on the
broader beneﬁts of inﬂation targeting. An important
accomplishment of inﬂation targeting is that it has
highlighted the importance of a stable objective. Even
if central banks do not formulate their objective in
terms of an inﬂation target, the notion that ﬁnancial
markets need guidance about the central bank’s ulti-
mate goal has had a lasting impact on non-inﬂation
targeters. A clear framework about the central bank’s
objective is crucial, particularly in the face of large
economic shocks. He also noted that not all inﬂation
targeters are equally successful in stabilizing inﬂation
expectations in the face of large shocks. Some central
banks have recently had to modify their inﬂation tar-
get, acknowledging that the initial target was not fea-
sible in the current economic environment. This
change risks jeopardizing the credibility of the central
bank.
Bill White acknowledged the beneﬁts of inﬂation tar-
geting in keeping inﬂation low, but pointed out that
the exclusive focus on low inﬂation has not prevented
the build-up of ﬁnancial instability. He recommends a
“serious rethink” of the goals of central banks, most
notably the operating paradigm of seeking price sta-
bility. White advocates integrating issues of ﬁnancial
stability more explicitly with the conduct of monetary
policy. Many issues of ﬁnancial stability need to be
addressed by regulatory measures, but there is never-
theless a role for frameworks that focus on the “long-
term” to avoid the build-up of unsustainable imbal-
ances.